Liberty and the challenge of diversity by KUKATHAS, Chandran
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
1-2018
Liberty and the challenge of diversity
Chandran KUKATHAS
Singapore Management University, kukathas@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Politics and Social Change Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
KUKATHAS, Chandran.(2018). Liberty and the challenge of diversity. Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy, 16, 681-695.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2916
Liberty and the Challenge of Diversity 
CHANDRAN KUKATHAS*  
ABSTRACT 
Those who favor liberty face a dilemma arising out of human diversity. 
While some groups of people will place a high value on liberty, others may 
consider it a lesser good or may value it scarcely at all. Preserving a free so-
ciety by forcing everyone to value liberty runs against the spirit of freedom; 
but leaving those groups who do not care for liberty to live in that way also 
diminishes liberty, if in a different way. In the end the dilemma has to be 
resolved in favor of tolerating even those who do not care for liberty and 
threaten to undermine it.  
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If it were only that people have diversities of taste, that is reason enough for 
not attempting to shape them all after one model. But different persons also 
require different conditions for their spiritual development; and can no more 
exist healthily in the same moral, than all the variety of plants can in the same 
physical, atmosphere and climate. The same things which are helps to one per-
son towards the cultivation of his higher nature, are hindrances to another. The 
same mode of life is a healthy excitement to one, keeping all his faculties of 
action and enjoyment in their best order, while to another it is a distracting 
burthen [sic], which suspends or crushes all internal life. Such are the differen-
ces among human beings in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of 
pain, and the operation on them of different physical and moral agencies, that 
unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither 
obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aes-
thetic stature of which their nature is capable. 
* Professor of Political Theory, Department of Government, London School of Economics. 
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John Stuart Mill, On Liberty.1 
We may consider, then, as one criterion of the goodness of a government, the 
degree in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, 
collectively and individually; since, besides that their well-being is the sole 
object of government, their good qualities supply the moving force which 
works the machinery. 
John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government.2 
I. CONCEPTUAL PRELIMINARIES 
If freedom is valuable, it is so at least partly because it leaves us to determine 
for ourselves what we value, and how to pursue our various ends. As a political 
principle, freedom is important because it recognizes that human purposes and 
aspirations are diverse and accepts that people should live the lives they wish to 
lead, not the lives that others deem good, best, or somehow fit for them. 
A person is free to the extent that he is able to pursue his ends unimpeded by 
others: he is more free the greater the range of opportunities he has to act and the 
greater the value attached to the opportunities he has, and his freedom is of value 
to him to the extent that he feels free. A person is also more free the more secure 
he is in the possession of his freedom—if he is not uncertain as to whether his 
freedom is about to be lost. To be free a person must also feel free. A person who 
does not feel free at all attaches no value to the opportunities he has to act and is 
unfree. 
A society is free to the extent that those who live within it (members and non- 
members alike) are able to pursue their ends unimpeded by others. It is more free 
the greater the range of opportunities they have to act and the greater the value 
attached to the opportunities they have; their freedom is of value to them to the 
extent that they feel free. The less secure they are in the possession of their free-
dom, and the more unsure they are of whether their freedom is about to be lost, the 
less free is their society. A society is unfree if those who live within it attach no 
value to the opportunities they have and do not feel free. 
A person, whether or not he is free, may value freedom highly, value it little, or 
value it scarcely at all. Even if he values it considerably, he may rank it less 
highly than other things he considers more important. He might therefore be will-
ing to forsake some (or possibly all) of his freedom for some other end. Few con-
sider freedom to be a value whose worth is absolute or think that freedom ought 
never to be traded away. Many hold freedom even less dear and gladly give much 
of it up in the service of other goals: soldiers forsake a good deal of freedom on 
1. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 75–76 
(John Gray ed. 1998) [hereinafter MILL, ON LIBERTY]. 
2. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861), reprinted in ON 
LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 227 (John Gray ed. 1998) [hereinafter MILL, REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT]. 
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joining the army, priests forsake it on taking their vows. Individuals give up a lit-
tle of it from time to time for many reasons—to do their duty, to please others, to 
improve themselves, to set an example, or because they think it will make them 
happier. To the extent that they forsake freedom willingly they forsake less free-
dom since they give up some opportunities in order to gain others they value 
more. 
A society, composed as it is of individuals who themselves value freedom to 
varying degrees, may value freedom highly, or value it lightly, or value it scarcely 
at all. Even societies that value it greatly may value it less than other goods to the 
extent that its laws and institutions allow for or require that freedom be traded 
from time to time in favor of other goods, such as security, welfare, equality, pi-
ety, or some combination of such goods. They will require individuals to forsake 
some of their freedom to ensure that some of these other goals, collectively 
deemed desirable, might be met. Forsaking freedom, willingly or unwillingly, is 
commonplace. But one important factor that distinguishes a more-free society 
from a less-free one is the extent of freedom not forsaken unwillingly. 
Freedom according to this view has four dimensions: scope, value, sense, and 
resilience. Scope refers to the range or number of opportunities an individual has 
to act unimpeded. Value refers to the worth of those opportunities, which can 
vary from the trivial (wiggling one’s fingers) to the substantial (traveling where 
one wishes).3 Sense refers to the individual’s subjective appreciation or percep-
tion of his freedom (that is, to whether he feels free). Resilience refers to the like-
lihood that the freedom defined along the other dimensions will continue to exist 
(which means that people living in fear, or with yet-to-be-fulfilled threats to their 
freedom, or under arbitrary rule, are less free if there is a low probability of their 
freedom remaining as extensive as before). 
A society is made up of a diversity of individuals who have a variety of ends, 
as well as different levels of appreciation of freedom. A society is also made up 
of groups of people who relate to one another within collectivities and in many 
cases with others as members of collectivities. An individual in one society, we 
might say, is a part of many other societies, some of which he might identify with 
strongly enough to consider himself to be a member. Some memberships are suf-
ficiently important to those who hold them that they consider their very identities 
to be substantially formed by their belonging to that society. Individuals may thus 
belong to or identify with their localities, their provinces, their countries, and 
their states; they may identify with their cultures, their ethnicities, their religions, 
their linguistic groups, and their nations; or, they may identify with groups that 
are comprised of some subset of one of these entities or comprised of people 
related by sharing some combination of characteristics—ethnicity, language, and 
3. What counts as an opportunity to act depends on the description of the act and its meaning. A 
movement of one’s fingers might, in one context, amount to nothing more than idle wiggling, but in 
another be a gesture of defiance, an attempt to communicate in signs, or an act of worship. Having an 
opportunity to act is not merely a matter of having the capacity for physical movement. 
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religion, for example. Since all kinds of combinations are possible, societies can 
be made up of all kinds of societies. Since people relate to one another not only 
within their groups, but also across groups, the composition of groups will change 
over time. With the passing of time, all societies, be they as large as empires or as 
small as villages, will be transformed to some degree. While stability along any 
one dimension is not impossible, it is nonetheless rare in the long-term. 
The extent to which individuals identify with the societies they have joined or 
(more likely) find themselves in will also vary, as will the extent to which they 
accept the authority that society attempts to exercise over them. The exercise of 
authority constrains individual freedom by determining the scope of freedom and 
by affecting the resilience of freedom. An individual is less free when those who 
have authority over him prescribe a reduction in the scope of his freedom, though 
he loses less freedom if he forsakes that freedom willingly. He can forsake that 
freedom directly by willingly accepting the loss of freedom those in authority 
prescribe, or indirectly by accepting the authority of those who are directing him 
to so direct him. In this case, when the individual willingly forsakes some of his 
freedom it is the scope of his freedom that is most markedly reduced. The value 
of his freedom might not, however, be negatively affected since he forsakes the 
opportunity to perform some actions in favor of the opportunity to perform others 
(including the act of abiding by the directions of those who have authority over 
him) that he values more. 
In any complex society—one that is itself made up of many societies— 
individuals will find themselves subject to many authorities that are able to limit 
their freedom. Some of these may be authorities that an individual has deliber-
ately authorized to limit some of his freedom. The individual might do this by 
joining a club or an organization or by pledging his allegiance to some persons 
or group. Others might be authorities whose power to limit his freedom he has 
accepted only to the extent that he has never repudiated it, whether because he 
has been persuaded or conditioned to think it warranted, or because he has sim-
ply never found reason to regard it as unjustified. Yet others might be authorities 
he accepts willingly, but grudgingly, because he considers the alternatives to ac-
ceptance unpalatable. And of course there are authorities whose power to limit 
freedom the individual must accept whether he wishes to or not because that 
authority can and will exercise force to ensure his compliance. All four of these 
types of authorities have the capacity to reduce the scope of the individual’s free-
dom, but only the fourth must always also reduce the value of the individual’s 
freedom when it determines the scope of his opportunities to act. 
A complex society is one in which there are many individuals who value free-
dom to varying degrees, and in which there are many different societies that also 
value freedom to varying degrees and exercise power over individuals, thereby 
constraining their freedom to varying degrees. The question is, how does one 
judge how free a society might be when understandings of the worth of freedom 
vary so considerably? It is sometimes alleged that human diversity poses a chal-
lenge to the idea or the possibility of freedom. This also raises the question of 
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whether diversity is compatible with, or can be reconciled with, freedom. Can a 
diverse society be a free society? I propose to consider these general questions 
here by tackling the problem of how a free society would deal with the fact that 
individuals, both severally and collectively, value freedom so differently. 
II. LIBERTARIAN DILEMMA 
A libertarian, at least for our purposes here, is someone who values liberty and 
thinks a society is better for being more free. In political life, libertarians come in 
many varieties, from anarcho-capitalists to Hayekian classical liberals to so- 
called left libertarians; but for the argument that is to follow here the term liber-
tarian also encompasses those who give great weight to liberty without wishing to 
adopt the libertarian badge: Rawlsian and Millsian liberals, for example, and 
many liberal egalitarians more generally. All of these people consider liberty to be 
an important good, and view freedom as an essential aspect of the good society. 
The issue all libertarians confront is the question of how to deal with those 
who do not value liberty as much as they do. In every society, we have already 
noted, there are those who would forsake at least some of, and possibly a good 
deal of, of their liberty in the pursuit of other ends. These people will, by their 
conduct, shape not only their own lives, but also shape the others’ lives and soci-
ety more generally. 
Most immediately, they will shape the lives of their children and their families 
since they will, like all parents, play a crucial role in socializing their offspring 
and others who come into their care. Though children are never perfect replicas 
of their parents, their attitudes and sense of what is valuable or important can be 
profoundly shaped by their upbringing. 
Less directly, those who value liberty less than libertarians will influence 
others, including the next generation, through their association with others who 
are like-minded. People associate in neighborhoods, in clans, in tribes, in reli-
gious communities, and in cultural groups of all kinds. In many of these forms of 
community or association, those who care relatively little for freedom will foster 
among those in their care similar attitudes toward freedom. While in some cases 
freedom will be taught to be prized, perhaps above all things, in many cases it 
will pale in significance beside other goods that are valorized (perhaps commu-
nity, piety, or conformity to particular traditions). 
In one other important way, those who value liberty less than libertarians will 
shape society’s attitudes toward liberty through their political activity. Particularly 
in a free society, everyone enjoys significant opportunities to participate in the 
making of laws and the designing or redesigning of social institutions. Those who 
value liberty less than other goods will have the opportunity to press for institu-
tional changes that reduce liberty in favor of some other goods deemed more wor-
thy of protection or advancement. 
The question for libertarians is whether upholding freedom requires leaving 
people to bring up their children as they see fit, associate as they wish, and partici-
pate in politics as they choose, or whether it demands that individual freedom in 
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all of these respects be limited in order to establish or perpetuate freedom more 
securely. The dilemma is that limiting freedom to secure it offends the very prin-
ciple of freedom; but refusing to limit freedom runs the risk of allowing those 
who do not value freedom to undermine it. The issue here is not the more straight-
forward one of whether restrictions on liberty can ever be justified. As we noted 
earlier, people frequently opt to forsake liberty for other ends they value more. 
Laws and social institutions also limit freedom by determining the scope of indi-
vidual opportunities to act. Rather, the issue is whether, in a free society, restric-
tions on freedom should reach deeper to try to ensure that freedom is preserved 
and perpetuated. Here liberty and diversity come into conflict to the extent that 
the principle of diversity condones (and thereby gives succor to) those who 
would, whether by accident or design, undermine liberty. 
That this issue reveals a genuine dilemma for libertarians, rather than a verbal 
puzzle to be resolved by a more careful use of language, is perhaps evident in the 
tension we find between two tendencies in the thought of modern liberalism’s 
most distinguished libertarian: John Stuart Mill. He began his essay, On Liberty, 
with an epigraph quoting Wilhelm von Humboldt: “The grand, leading principle, 
towards which every argument unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the 
absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity.”4 
In Mill’s reading, Humboldt’s insight was to see the importance of freedom and a 
variety of situations, for these two things were “necessary conditions of human de-
velopment, because necessary to render people unlike one another.”5 What had 
saved Europe from the stagnation now endured by China, he argued, was its diver-
sity; though when he wrote On Liberty, he feared that that might soon change: 
What is it that has hitherto preserved Europe from this lot? What has made the 
European family of nations an improving, instead of a stationary portion of 
mankind? Not any superior excellence in them, which, when it exists, exists as 
the effect, not as the cause; but their remarkable diversity of character and cul-
ture. Individuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another: 
they have struck out a great variety of paths, each leading to something valua-
ble; and although at every period those who travelled in different paths have 
been intolerant of one another, and each would have thought it an excellent 
thing if all the rest could have been compelled to travel his road, their attempts 
to thwart each other’s development have rarely had any permanent success, 
and each has in time endured to receive the good which the others have 
offered. Europe is, in my judgment, wholly indebted to this plurality of paths 
for its progressive and many-sided development. But it already begins to pos-
sess this benefit in a considerably less degree. It is decidedly advancing 
towards the Chinese ideal of making all people alike.6 
4. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 1, at xxxvi (quoting Wilhelm Von Humboldt, SPHERE AND DUTIES 
OF GOVERNMENT (1792)). 
5. Id. at 81. 
6. Id. at 80–81. 
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Yet if we turn to Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government we find 
a very different concern. The diversity of nationalities under a single regime he 
now finds to be a problem rather than an advantage.7 And one of the purposes of 
government, if it is to govern well, he now thinks, is to attend to the character of 
the population. 
We have now, therefore, obtained a foundation for a twofold division of the 
merit which any set of political institutions can possess. It consists partly of 
the degree in which they promote the general mental advancement of the com-
munity, including under that phrase advancement in intellect, in virtue, and in 
practical activity and efficiency; and partly of the degree of perfection with 
which they organize the moral, intellectual, and active worth already existing, 
so as to operate with the greatest effect on public affairs. A government is to 
be judged by its action upon men, and by its action upon things; by what it 
makes of the citizens, and what it does with them; its tendency to improve or 
deteriorate the people themselves, and the goodness or badness of the work it 
performs for them, and by means of them. Government is at once a great influ-
ence acting on the human mind, and a set of organized arrangements for public 
business: in the first capacity its beneficial action is chiefly indirect, but not 
therefore less vital, while its mischievous action may be direct.8 
The Mill of On Liberty is convinced that diversity, far from being a threat to 
liberty, gives liberty its point. What could matter more than human development 
in its richest diversity, and how better to promote it than by a regime of liberty 
that leaves people to pursue their own goals as they see fit? But the Mill of the 
Considerations worries that, left to their own devices and desires, people will not 
become sufficiently alike to be governed as a single collectivity, nor develop suf-
ficient virtue to be governed at all. Libertarian though he is, Mill cannot help 
think that the government of a free society must take upon itself the task of foster-
ing the qualities necessary for all individuals to possess for the society to prosper. 
If freedom matters, and matters above all, should we seek to ensure that a free 
society is populated by people who appreciate its importance, or at least who pos-
sess the qualities and attitudes needed to sustain it? Or, if freedom matters, and 
matters above all, should we let freedom find expression in the great diversity of 
human attitudes toward all things, including freedom? Should people be forced to 
be free? Or if not forced, at least induced—threatened, tricked, cajoled, bribed, 
manipulated, or generally educated—into that condition? 
A. The First Answer 
The first answer is that a free society does not leave the liberty of its members 
to chance or its future as a society to the fates but takes active steps to ensure that 
freedom will prevail. This means taking an interest in the lives its members lead. 
7. MILL, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, supra note 2, at 205. 
8. Id. at 229. 
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But it also means taking an interest in the kinds of individuals its institutions cre-
ate and sustain, in the kinds of societies it fosters in its midst, and in the political 
activity it will permit. 
The reason for taking an interest in the lives of society’s members is first to 
ensure that they do in fact enjoy liberty. Their liberty might otherwise be limited 
by a number of factors. First, they might be ignorant of the possibility of freedom 
and lead lives that are less free than they might otherwise be. Unaware of the pos-
sibilities open to them, they might pursue only a narrow range of goods when 
greater knowledge would lead them to consider other ways of leading satisfying 
lives. The scope of their freedom might be restricted by this lack of understanding 
and the value of their freedom might also be reduced accordingly as they pursue 
ends that have little merit. Second, their liberty might be limited by their subjec-
tion to the power of others who are able to coerce them into actions they do not 
wish to take or to prevent them from pursuing opportunities they might otherwise 
consider. Third, their liberty might be limited by the influence of those who exer-
cise authority over them, whether as parents, community leaders, or members of 
a group to which the individual is loyal. 
The reason for taking steps to ensure that liberty is actually enjoyed may be all 
the more acute when many groups of people in society put less store in liberty 
than in other values or ideals. If such groups limit the education of all children or 
reserve opportunities to boys but not girls, there is reason to act to expand the lib-
erty of those denied it. If parents insist on mutilating their children in accordance 
with their own particular traditions or on denying their children medical treat-
ments because of their customs or beliefs, there is reason to act to defend the lib-
erty of those denied it. If groups try to compel their members to marry against 
their will, or to take up a profession they do not care for, or simply to conform to 
the thinking and practices of the group, there is reason to act in defense of those 
whose freedom is thereby reduced. 
If the first reason for taking an interest in the lives of society’s members is to 
uphold their liberty for its own sake, the second reason for doing so is to protect 
the long-term interests of the free society itself. If a society is to remain free it 
will not be enough for it to exercise power to try to preserve freedom by force. 
Individuals must themselves take an interest in that freedom. A free society must 
be made up of people who hold the right attitudes and preferences. It cannot be 
sustained unless its members hold freedom to be important and are not inclined to 
trade it away for other goods. If this is the case, then a free society cannot help 
but take some interest in the identities people come to have. It will not do simply 
to leave the formation of people’s attitudes and preferences to chance or the pred-
ilections of parents and groups. A free society is a non-excludable good, and one 
that cannot be secured unless the great majority of people play their part by sus-
taining the ethos of freedom. And this means that, at least to some degree, people 
must be taught—convinced—to be free. 
This line of reasoning is not unusual in political philosophy, which has been 
preoccupied with the problem of how the good society, once conceived and 
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instituted, can be preserved. Hobbes certainly appreciated the problem when he 
addressed the question of the education of subjects by the sovereign power that 
was properly concerned to ensure the preservation of the Commonwealth. In 
Chapter 30 of Leviathan, he dwells on the importance of teaching the right doc-
trine so that people become inclined to obey the sovereign not merely out of fear 
but out of an appreciation of the importance of obedience.9 Above all, they must 
be taught that it is a mistake to think that they ought to be governed by conscience 
or private judgment when considering the laws of the commonwealth. Indeed 
Hobbes ends the second part of his treatise by commending his work to any sov-
ereign who cares for his help, since his own teaching could profitably be “con-
verted into the utility of practice” by being used to guide the education of the 
public.10 
More recently, John Rawls, in his defense of his Theory of Justice, and of a 
Political Liberalism more generally, has dwelt at length on the problem of how to 
ensure the stability of the just society described by his work.11 A part of that task 
is to be achieved by the articulation of a conception of justice that might draw the 
allegiance of an overlapping consensus of people with a diverse array of political 
and ethical commitments. But no less importantly, a measure of public education 
would be needed to prepare children to become fully cooperating members of so-
ciety. Though this public education might well have the effect of turning some 
children into persons whose identities their parents will not welcome, for Rawls 
this is a consequence that must be accepted, even if regretfully. The state must, 
after all, raise the citizens of the future, and this means raising people who under-
stand the public culture of their society. 
Rawls is not so far from Mill’s concern. A free society must be built on free 
citizens. While the point of freedom might be to encourage the development of 
human capacities in all their diversity, that diversity cannot be allowed to stand in 
the way of freedom. 
One further implication of this first answer to the question of whether diversity 
should be suppressed in the interest of freedom is that political activity cannot be 
tolerated when it poses a serious challenge to the free society. Many people and 
groups, even if they do care some for freedom, wish to overturn the established 
political order to recreate or transform society. Revolutionary movements are of-
ten dedicated entirely to such tasks. If political organizations (or parties or move-
ments, etc.) are likely to endanger freedom, there is reason to act in defense of the 
free society by taking measures necessary to suppress the threat. It might be war-
ranted to ban some political organizations, monitor the activities of others, and in-
carcerate those individuals who are responsible—if these measures would be 
effective. The suppression of freedom of some would be justified by the need to 
9. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 219–233 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1994) (1651). 
10. Id. at 244. 
11. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (revised 
ed. 1996). 
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protect freedom for all. Political diversity cannot be tolerated if it poses a risk to 
political liberty. 
B. Second Answer 
A different response to the fact of diversity, and to the diversity of attitudes to 
freedom in particular, is to regard diversity as something to be tolerated. This 
means tolerating persons, groups, and political organizations whose conduct 
might threaten liberty, whether immediately or in the long-term. 
The first reason for taking this stance is that honoring or adhering to a commit-
ment to freedom is inconsistent with the exercise of force to compel people to 
live their lives contrary to their own wishes or preferences. People’s preferences 
vary, and this includes their preference for freedom, which they might trade off 
for other possibilities they value more. To exercise force to prevent them making 
the trade-offs they prefer is inconsistent with respect for freedom. 
It is, of course, possible that people will use their freedom to restrict others in 
the exercise of their freedom. Here it may be defensible to interfere with one per-
son’s freedom if the purpose is to prevent him from interfering with another’s 
freedom. Thus, if Alf is interfering with Bob’s freedom, it would be justified to 
act to prevent Alf from doing so. However, it is vital that Bob regards Alf’s 
actions as an unwarranted interference and prefers that Alf not interfere. If Bob 
does not object to Alf’s interference, there is no warrant for anyone else to restrict 
Alf’s actions. Bob’s wishes are decisive, and there is no warrant for intervening 
on Bob’s behalf unless there is some good reason to think he would want it. 
In this view, the question of how people come to acquire their preferences or 
desires is not a matter that needs to be considered. If some people do not value 
freedom enough to wish to uphold it, or are willing to let others direct them, that 
must simply be accepted. The fact that some people might be socialized into 
thinking that their freedom is not as valuable a commodity as other goods also 
has to be accepted. Respect for freedom does not mean second-guessing people’s 
attitudes or giving less weight to the preferences of those who seem to have 
traded away more of their freedom than one might think sensible, prudent, or 
rational. 
The fact that it is possible under such a regime for large numbers of people 
to be socialized into having a very limited appreciation of freedom makes no 
difference to the principle of non-interference with freedom. There is no war-
rant here for educating people to appreciate or value freedom. The education of 
individuals is a matter that is to be left to others willing to instruct them, 
whether as adults or as children. If this means running the risk that the society 
will underappreciates the principle of freedom—even to the point of signifi-
cantly increasing the chance of the principle being overturned—the risk must 
be run. If diversity threatens to undermine freedom, then the free society must 
live with that threat rather than interfere with the decisions made by individuals 
exercising their freedom. 
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This answer to the question of whether to tolerate a diversity of attitudes to-
ward freedom extends also to the issue of how to deal with political diversity— 
particularly those political outlooks that look to undermine freedom. Tempting 
though it might be to outlaw political organizations or political activity whose 
purpose is to turn the free society into one that trades away a good deal of free-
dom in the service of other ends, there is no warrant for it. Those who preach rev-
olution must be allowed to do so; those who try to persuade others to abandon 
freedom in the name of the class struggle, or social justice, or piety, or conserva-
tive morality, or racial purity, and or for any other reason, must be permitted to 
do so. The reason for this is not that such persons and their organizations pose no 
danger—they might. The reason is rather that this is a risk a free society must 
take if it is to adhere to a commitment not to interfere with freedom. Living in a 
free society means living dangerously, at least in some circumstances. 
The only occasion on which interference with freedom is warranted is to pre-
vent an immediate interference with another’s freedom when the subject of this 
interference does not wish to accept it. The justification for interference on such 
occasions is as follows: any individual whose freedom is threatened may right-
fully resist the threat to his freedom. If that individual, the principal, wishes to 
appoint an agent to assist him in resisting that threat, or to act on his behalf, then 
the agent so appointed is warranted in acting to prevent those threatening the free-
dom of the principal. What exactly an agent may legitimately do to uphold the 
freedom of the principal is, of course, subject to many other considerations. The 
fact that an agent is authorized to pursue some end does not mean that he has 
the right to use any means to achieve it. Authorization is necessary, but is not suf-
ficient, for acting in defense of another’s freedom.12 
If this answer is correct, the implications are significant. A free society could 
turn out to be one that is made up of a number of societies which are themselves 
not all equally free. Indeed, some of them might be societies in which the princi-
ple of freedom was scarcely honored at all. The only freedom all individuals 
could seek to uphold by force is the freedom not to be interfered with by those 
whose authority or power over them they repudiate. Since no one has any claim 
to have enforced his own preferences about how others behave when they are not 
interfering with him, the only freedom he can seek to enforce is the freedom to 
dissociate from others whose behavior he finds restrictive of his own freedom. If 
he is not willing to dissociate from them, he may simply have to accept the only 
terms of association they are prepared to offer, and if necessary a reduction of his 
own freedom. He cannot appeal to others to enforce better terms, any more than 
they can. On this account, many different kinds of societies might have to count 
as free societies, including some in which the smaller societies which are scarcely 
free at all. 
12. That authorization might come after the fact since an agent might anticipate a principal’s desire 
for assistance; but the act of assistance to defend freedom would only be justified if that authorization 
were eventually granted. 
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III. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
These answers offer two very different responses to the challenge to freedom 
posed by diversity. The depth of the challenge lies in the fact that either response 
to the fact of diversity might be viewed as consistent or inconsistent with free-
dom. What should a libertarian do? Which is the libertarian answer? 
The first answer looks plausible because it asserts the importance of maximiz-
ing freedom and ensuring its resilience. It tries to maximize freedom, first, by 
restricting the opportunity of some to interfere with the actions of others. It limits 
the control that some people have over others: parents over children, employers 
over employees, groups over members, and communities generally over individu-
als. “Unfreedom” will not be tolerated. Freedom will be enforced. 
It tries to maximize freedom, secondly, by attempting to ensure that the prac-
tice of freedom does not deteriorate with the erosion of the traditions, attitudes, 
and beliefs that sustain it. It takes seriously the task of social reproduction—in 
this case, the social reproduction of the free society. Interference with freedom 
can be justified if the goal is the preservation or extension of freedom.13 
The first answer tries to maximize freedom, generally, by ensuring freedom’s 
resilience across space and over time. This may mean establishing institutions 
with the power to preserve liberty, and perhaps even with the power to extend it. 
While it might be necessary to design such institutions so as to ensure that they 
do not themselves become a threat to liberty, this is no reason not to create them 
in the first place. 
In spite of the immediate plausibility of the first answer, however, I think the 
second is the one a libertarian should adopt. Before considering why, it is impor-
tant to be clear about what the second answer amounts to. It involves conceding 
that, from the point of view of freedom, it is better that a society tolerate the inter-
ference by some with the freedom of others, that it accept that the influence or 
control that some have over others might lead to a greater willingness of majority 
of society to trade away their freedom for other goods, and that it refrain from 
suppressing those who might be dedicated to the destruction of the free society in 
the name of some other ideal. How could this possibly be defended? 
There are both practical and principled reasons for preferring the second an-
swer to the first. The practical reasons rest on a skepticism about the wisdom of 
trying to preserve liberty by establishing or increasing the power of some agent or 
agents. If liberty is to be preserved, power must be checked. The best way to 
check power is by dispersing it. The problem with dispersing power among a di-
versity of agents is that they themselves do not face the sanction that might be 
imposed upon them by a more powerful agent. They will be checked by the com-
petition they face from other powerful agents, and by the fact that those who are 
13. It would be too strong to say that only the preservation of freedom can justify interference with 
freedom. A defender of freedom need not say that nothing else can justify trading away some freedom. 
Valuing freedom means putting a high price on freedom, not placing it beyond any price. Extremism in 
the pursuit of liberty is indeed a vice, Senator Goldwater to the contrary notwithstanding. 
692 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:681 
under their control might abandon them in favor of associating with others. The 
problem with not dispersing power is that the most powerful agent will not be 
checked by anyone. The issue here is how to control the abuse of power. Those 
who are skeptical about the idea of establishing power to preserve liberty doubt 
that power can be controlled by mechanisms other than dispersal: legal or consti-
tutional devices may have their place, but ultimately will not suffice unless power 
is effectively dispersed in fact and not just in law. The constitutional power is no 
substitute for the social separation of power. 
The problem with giving anyone power is that there is always a risk that such 
power will be abused. Giving great power to one in order to protect the many 
from the power of the few does not ensure that the many will be protected. A vari-
ety of outcomes are possible. The one may suppress the few without benefiting 
the many. Some of the few may collude with the one to mutual advantage and the 
exclusion of all others. The one may benefit some of the many in return for gain. 
The possibility that the one will disinterestedly check the power of the few for the 
good of all is no more than one among numerous possibilities. 
Even when those in power are not self-interested or self-serving, however, 
there remains the problem that there is still no capacity to check power. Mill 
thought in Considerations on Representative Government that good government 
required the creation and reproduction of the right kinds of citizens.14 But creat-
ing the right kind of being is no easy matter. The thinker who devoted more atten-
tion to this problem than any other was Rousseau, who recognized that the 
problem was fundamentally intractable. The best kind of education, whether pri-
vate or public, “tries to establish a harmony between the self and the environ-
ment.”15 The difficulty, however, as Judith Shklar observes, is that the citizen, 
“however much denatured, however conscious of his civic self, has still an indi-
vidual self, an inner life of his own, and it is bound to assert itself as soon as the 
vigilant eye of the Legislator is removed.”16 
No less of a problem is any form of education that seeks to cultivate what is 
particular about the individual, for that would run counter to the aims of the kind 
of civic education thinkers like Mill envisaged as a means of creating the right 
kind of social beings. A cohesive community cannot be built on those who cher-
ish the moi humain. But if left to their own devices, individuals are more likely to 
be shaped and influenced by the particular communities from which they come. 
The power of a greater agency or institution, such as the state, to try to create the 
right kinds of citizens will undoubtedly have some effect; but there is little reason 
to think the effect will be entirely consistent with the original intention. 
14. See MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 1 passim. 
15. JUDITH SHKLAR, MEN AND CITIZENS: A STUDY OF ROUSSEAU’S SOCIAL THEORY 159 (2nd ed. 
1985). 
16. Id. at 160. This task is beyond any actual legislator, which is why in The Social Contract 
Rousseau makes the ideal legislator superhuman. Id. 
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Still, if we leave aside the practical considerations, there remain some impor-
tant reasons of principle for preferring the second answer to the question of how 
to deal with the challenge of diversity. The first appeals to one of the reasons Mill 
offered for valuing and trying to uphold liberty. Individuals are diverse in nature, 
and their spiritual development requires different “moral climates”. This in itself 
tells against the wisdom and justifiability of trying to “shape them all after one 
model,” even if we think that one particular way of conceiving of free persons 
and the free society is best. This is perhaps the Mill of On Liberty (particularly 
the first half) rather than the Mill of On Representative Government. But that is 
Mill at his most libertarian. 
The second reason for preferring the second answer is that in making judg-
ments about freedom we should worry less about the scope and the resilience of 
freedom and more about its value and the individual’s sense of it. The range of 
opportunities an individual has to act is an important aspect of his freedom, but 
the scope does not matter nearly as much as the value of the opportunities he has. 
The value of those opportunities is determined to a very significant extent by the 
individual’s desire for them. Increasing greatly the number of opportunities an 
individual has to act while at the same time reducing the number of options he 
most values may well mean reducing the individual’s overall freedom. Of course 
a trade-off may have to be made between enjoying more opportunities to act and 
enjoying the opportunities one values most. But respect for liberty means leaving 
that trade-off in the hands of the individual. Very great weight has to be given in 
all this to the individual’s sense of freedom. An individual must feel free to some 
degree if he is to be regarded as a free person. Leaving him to make the trade-off 
himself is vital for this. Merely expanding the set of options available to him, no 
matter how valuable we might think these options to be, will neither make him 
more free nor leave him feeling free. For these reasons, forcing people to be free 
is inconsistent with freedom. 
This also means that, while the resilience of freedom is not something to be 
discounted, neither is it something to be overrated. To be sure, a person is more 
free if he is more secure in his freedom and assured that the freedom he enjoys 
today will still be enjoyed tomorrow. He is more free if he is not subject to the 
exercise of arbitrary power that leaves him uncertain about whether his freedom 
will be taken away. But the question is: how much resilience is necessary? The 
answer is: not so necessary that it is worth being subject to greater non-arbitrary 
power, and not so necessary that it is worth being forced into trading away some 
freedom today in return for an assurance of no greater loss of freedom tomorrow. 
The final reason for preferring the second answer to the libertarian dilemma is 
that the proper attitude to take to freedom—if one truly values it—is one of 
respect for how it manifests itself in human activity. Like many important values, 
it is something that should be honored—and honored not in the breach—rather 
than maximized. If we attach great value to community, we respect it when we 
encounter it rather than ask whether we might get a little more of it by undermin-
ing some communities. If we attach great importance to justice, we try to be just, 
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and do not ask whether we might increase the amount of justice in the world by 
occasionally acting unjustly. And if we value liberty, we respect people’s free-
dom to act without asking whether we might increase overall liberty by reducing 
the liberty of those whose exercise of their liberty will not maximize the amount 
of liberty in the world. Not everyone will find this final reason compelling since it 
is far from obvious that morality requires that we try to respect certain values 
rather than increase their presence in the world. But those who accept this attitude 
are more likely to find the second libertarian response to the dilemma posed by di-
versity congenial.  
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